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CaseNo.20080351-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

Luke Zachary Baker,
Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Petitioner
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(a)
(West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted the State's petition on the following two issues:
1. "Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or application of the
Fourth Amendment as to the permissible length and scope of detention of
passengers in a vehicle that police have stopped." See Order, dated 11 July 2008 (a
copy is attached in addendum A).

2. "Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or application of the
Fourth Amendment relating to the circumstances under which searches for weapons
may be conducted/' Id.
Standard of Review. On certiorari review, this Court reviews "the decision of
the court of appeals, not the decision of the district court." Utah County v. Butler,
2008 UT 12, 1 9, 179 P.3d 775 (quotation marks and citations omitted). "The
correctness of the court of appeal's decision turns on whether that court correctly
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id.
(quotation marks and citations omitted). The appellate court reviews for clear error
the factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,f11,100 P3d 1222. The trial court's legal
conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application
of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,112,103 P.3d 699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a
drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(2)(a)(, (4) (West 2004), possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(4), 58-37a-5 (West 2004).
Rl.
Motion to suppress. Defendant was one of four passengers detained incident
to the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of the driver. After police officers recovered
thirteen knives from the driver and passengers, including defendant, and a drugdetection dog alerted on the vehicle, defendant and the other passengers were
subjected to weapons frisks, which led to the discovery of a drug pipe on
defendant's person. See R149:6-8. Subsequent searches of defendant's person
revealed methamphetamine and additional paraphernalia. Id.; see also R150:28.
Defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence. R41-36.
Facts.1 In the early morning hours of 30 September 2004, Officer Robertson of
the Pleasant Grove Police Department stopped a vehicle for "no plate light/' R149:5.
1

The facts are adduced from the preliminary hearing held on 24 November
2004, see R149, and the suppression hearing held on 9 February 2005, see R150. They
are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying defendant's
motion to suppress. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1230 (Utah 1996).
3

As he approached the vehicle, Officer Robertson saw five occupants, including
defendant, who was one of three backseat passengers. R150:25-26. The officer
"used a flashlight to survey the back passengers before [he] approached the driver."
Id. at 25. He saw a large sheathed knife "on one of the rear passengers." Id. at 26; see
also R149:13 ("It was in plain view in a leather sheath, fairly large knife"). After
talking with the driver and obtaining her license, Officer Robertson returned to his
patrol car to run a computer check, which revealed that the driver's license was
"[s]uspended for drugs." R149:5; R150:25; see also R149:ll. Simultaneously with
learning that the driver's license was suspended, Officer Robertson requested a K~9
unit, at approximately 1:21 a.m. R149:ll, 18.
While waiting for the K-9 unit to arrive, Officer Robertson initiated an arrest
of the driver, and alerted a backup officer, Officer Bartell, that "there were knives in
plain view." R149:14; see also id. at 6, and R150:26. While Officer Robertson
continued with the arrest of the driver, Officer Bartell asked the vehicle occupants
about weapons. R150:9.
One of the rear seat passengers told Officer Bartell that he had a knife. R150:9.
Officer Bartell said, "[W]ell, I better take the knife until we finish[] up with the
stop," and also asked "if there were anymore [sic] knives in the vehicle." Id. In
response, "[e]veryone started handing [him] knives— [E]verybody at least handed
4

[him] one knife/' R150:9-10; see also id. at 11-12. Some were large pocketknives, with
approximately five to six inch blades. R150:12, 21. There was also a set of small
throwing knives that were about three to four indies long. R150:12. Approximately
thirteen knives were recovered from the driver and passengers and set out on the
hood of a patrol car. R149:13, 21; see also R150:16, 27. According to Officer
Robertson, it was "rare" to find a knife during a traffic stop, let alone thirteen
knives. R150:32.
At approximately 1:33 a.m. the driver was placed in the patrol car, and at 1:34
a.m., or approximately thirteen minutes after it was requested, the K-9 unit arrived.
R149:17-18. The K-9 unit included Officer Lopez and his police service dog. R150:5.
Officer Lopez "made a safety check of the exterior of the vehicle," and then
"deploy[ed his] police service dog." Id. at 6. The dog alerted twice on the vehicle:
once "on the trunk of the vehicle on the driver's side," and once "on the driver's
handle—the driver's rear passenger handle of the vehicle, the rear door." Id.) see also
id. at 7.
After the dog alerted, another backup officer, Officer Rockwood, removed the
passengers from the vehicle and frisked them. R150:15-16. In the course of frisking
defendant, Officer Rockwood "found a bulge in his front [pants] pocket," and
"asked [defendant] if [he] could retrieve it," and "what it was." Id. at 17. After
5

defendant responded that the object was a pipe, Officer Rockwood "retrieved it out
of his pocket." Id. at 18. Officer Rockwood observed that the pipe had been used
for marijuana. Id. A further frisk of defendant's shoe yielded a second pipe. Id.
Defendant was arrested and taken to the police station where Officer Robertson
recovered a small baggy containing seventy-one grams of methamphetamine from
defendant's person. R149:7-8.
Ruling. Based on this evidence, the trial court entered a written ruling
denying defendant's motion to suppress the paraphernalia and methamphetamine
seized from his person.2 The trial court began by recognizing that police officers
may reasonably require passengers to remain inside a vehicle during a traffic stop,
and that "a canine sniff conducted during a [] lawful traffic stop... does not violate
the Fourth Amendment." R73-72 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) and
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)).
The trial court also entered the following factual findings:
•

"[T]he... traffic stop... was initiated very early in the morning
on September 30,2004[.]" R72.

•

"[T]he K-9 was requested at 1:21 a.m.," "the K-9 arrived at 1:34
a.m.," and "[defendant was searched and arrested at 1:45 a.m."
Id.

2

A copy of the trial court's ruling is attached in addendum B.
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•

"The request for the K-9 coincided with the discovery that the
driver's license had been suspended for drugs." Id.

•

"Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the
actual time length of the stop or in connection with the K-9
request[.]" Id.

•

"The K-9 arrived soon after the driver was placed under arrest in
the police car[.] Id.

•

"[I]t was dark, extremely early in the morning, there were five
occupants, two knives had already been found, and the officers
were dealing with the driver and her arrest until the K-9
arrived." Id.

•

"[T]he officers never told the Defendant that he was not free to
leave, although [the officer] testified that he subjectively believed
that (which is irrelevant)." Id.

Although the trial court recognized that detaining passengers was reasonable
under Wilson, based on the above findings, the trial court ultimately concluded that
no detention occurred here because police "never told [defendant that he was not
free to leave." R72 (concluding defendant "was not 'detained' for purposes of
Fourth Amendment protections to be triggered").3
The trial court also entered findings regarding the frisk of defendant's person,
finding that "the K-9 unit, which responded to the scene 13 minutes after it was
3

The trial court's finding that defendant was not seized incident to the traffic
stop predates the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brendlin v. California,
127 S.Ct 2400,2403 (2007), where that Court clarified "that a passenger is seized"
incident to a traffic stop of the driver.
7

called, alerted to the exterior of the vehicle that the Defendant was traveling in/'
R72; see also id. ("Defendant has failed to challenge the canine's accuracy record").
From this finding, the trial court concluded that defendant was "properly searched
incident to the probable cause derived from the positive canine alert." R71.
Finally, the trial court made findings regarding an alternative, weapons-frisk
justification for the search of defendant's person:
•

"When the police [officers] initially approached the vehicle, they
noted that one of the occupants in the back seat was armed with
a large knife." R70-69.

•

"[W]hen the driver was searched incident to arrest for driving
on a suspended license, another knife was found on her." R69.

•

"After the officers requested that the passengers turn over any
other knives they had on them, a total of 13 knives were
recovered, including at least one from the Defendant." Id.

•

"Officer Mike Bartell, who retrieved the knives,.. . recovered
about 12 knives from the passengers, including a set of throwing
knives." R70.

•

"Officer Chris Lavar Rockwood, who arrived to assist Officer
Raymond Robertson, conducted the Terry frisk of . . .
[defendant." Id.

•

"Before conducting the frisk, Officer Rockwood had observed
'quite a few,' 'more than five' knives that had been taken from
the vehicle and that they 'ranged [in size] from pocket knives to
large knives.' He also admitted that while there had been no
overt threats from the passengers, he still had a concern for
officer safety after observing the large number of knives." Id.
8

•

"Officer Robertson testified that it was a rare case to retrieve 1213 knives from a vehicle/' Id.

•

"Officer Robertson... is always concerned about officer safety,
though he personally had no fear at this scene for his own
safety." Id.

•

"[T]he Court emphasizes that it was dark, around 1:30 a.m., and
there were a total of five occupants in the vehicle." Id.

•

"In sum, the Terry frisk of . . . [djefendant did not occur until
after:
a.
The driver had been placed under arrest,
b.
12-13 knives had been retrieved from the
passengers and driver, including some large knives,
c.
A police-trained drug-detection canine alerted to
the trunk and the rear door of the vehicle. The
Court also notes that . . . [djefendant was a
passenger in the rear seat at the time." Id.

Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that "[t]he sheer number of
knives alerted the officers that it was reasonable to conclude that there might be
other weapons." Id. Accordingly, "it could not be much more clear that the officers
reasonably believed that... [djefendant and the other passengers were armed and
dangerous." Id. "[Thus], the officers conducted a proper Terry frisk of . . .
[djefendant." R69.
Conditional guilty plea. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to both
charges, preserving his right to appeal the adverse ruling. R112-105,116-113.

9

Sentence. The trial court imposed an indeterminate term of one to fifteen
years for the second degree felony, and a one-year jail term for the class B
misdemeanor. R120. The court then suspended both terms and imposed a thirtysix-month probation term, including a ninety-day jail term. R119.
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R124.
The court of appeals' opinion. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
order denying the motion to suppress. See State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, % 19,182
P.3d 935 (a copy is attached in addendum C). The court of appeals recognized that
police officers may "temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants" incident to a
traffic stop. Ti 10-11 (citing Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (2007) and State v.
James, 2000 UT 80,110,13 P.3d 576). But here, once the driver was arrested for
driving on suspension, the court of appeals held there was no longer any "lawful
reason why the passengers were detained." Id. at % 12. According to the court of
appeals, "the officers needed some reasonable articulable suspicion to lawfully
detain [defendant] and the other passengers." Id. at 113. Because the officers did
not suspect criminal activity on the part of the passengers, the court of appeals
reasoned that "continued detention was impermissible." Id. The court of appeals
thus held that "[defendant] was unlawfully detained from the moment the driver
was placed under arrest." Id. at 1 1 9 . The court of appeals did not address the
10

State's argument that passengers are reasonably detained until all the lawful
objectives of a traffic stop are completed, including the arrest of the driver and
incident search of the vehicle. See Aple. Br. at 12-16,18-19 (discussing Wilson and
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
A majority of the court of appeals further held that the weapons frisk of
defendant's person was not justified by a reasonable suspicion that he or any of the
other passengers may be armed and dangerous. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f l 14-18;
see also id. at f 20 (Thorne, J., concurring) (agreeing that Baker was unlawfully
frisked, but clarifying that frisk was "illegal solely because the length and scope of
Baker's detention prior to the frisk was unreasonable under the circumstances").
The majority acknowledged that the trial court's ruling upholding the weapons frisk
was based on its findings that "it was dark, it was late at night, the driver had been
arrested, there were four passengers who had been in possession of approximately
thirteen knives, and a K~9 unit had detected controlled substances where the three
passengers (including [defendant]) sat." Id. at f 14. "Looking at the totality of the
circumstances!;]" however, the majority held that "nothing other than the knives gave
police officers any reason to take precautionary steps." Id. at f 1 8 (emphasis added).
The majority reasoned that the thirteen knives did not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that the passengers may be armed and dangerous because, when asked,
11

the passengers "volunteered" the knives to the officers. Id. The majority also
deemed it significant that the weapons frisks of the passengers were "not conducted
until well after the officers collected the knives and only after the K-9 unit indicated
the presence of drugs in the backseat of the vehicle." Id. (emphasis in original).
Thus, the majority surmised that "the mere presence of the already-confiscated
knives did not tip the scales in favor of an objectively reasonable concern for officer
safety." W . a t l l 9 . 4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1(A). For reasons of officer safety, police officers may detain passengers
incident to a traffic stop of the driver until all the lawful objectives of the stop are
completed. If a vehicle occupant is arrested, the lawful objectives of the stop
evolve, as a matter of law, to include safely searching the passenger
compartment.
Here, defendant was one of four passengers detained incident to a traffic
stop of the driver, who was subsequently arrested for driving on a license
4

As noted above, the trial court found the frisk of defendant's person was
justified on two alternative grounds: (1) probable cause that defendant, a backseat
passenger, possessed drugs once the drug-detection dog alerted to the handle of the
rear, driver's side door, see R72-71; and (2) reasonable suspicion that defendant may
possess a weapon given the thirteen knives retrieved from the vehicle occupants, see
R71-69. The court of appeals addressed only the latter ruling.
12

suspended for drugs. Defendant was therefore lawfully detained until the
passenger compartment could be safely searched. Because defendant was
frisked before the officers could safely search the passenger compartment,
defendant continued to be lawfully detained when the weapons frisk occurred.
The court of appeals did not acknowledge the State's argument. Rather,
that court held that the passengers could not be detained absent individual
reasonable suspicion once the driver was arrested and placed in the patrol
vehicle.
The United States Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the question
of whether officers may detain passengers while they search the passenger
compartment as a consequence of the driver's, or any other occupant's, arrest.
But that Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, with its emphasis on officer
safety, makes clear that the risk of harm to both the police officers and the vehicle
occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command
during a traffic stop.
The court of appeals' holding is inconsistent with the weighty officer
safety concerns recognized in the United States Supreme Court's most recent
precedent and should therefore be overturned.

13

1(B), In any event, defendant's extended detention here was supported byreasonable suspicion that he may be armed and dangerous. Officer Robertson
saw a knife on one of the back seat passengers when he first approached the
vehicle. Ultimately, thirteen knives were retrieved from the vehicle occupants.
Additionally, the driver was arrested for driving on suspension for drugs, a
drug-dog alerted on the vehicle, the five vehicle occupants outnumbered the
three to four officers variously at the scene, the hour was late, and the area was
dark. These circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the
belief that the extended detention was appropriate.
II. Finally, the reasonable suspicion that justified defendant's extended
detention during the traffic stop, also justified the weapons frisk of his person. A
majority of the court of appeals held, however, that "nothing other than the
knives gave police officers any reason to take precautionary steps," and that
because the knives had been confiscated when defendant was frisked, the frisk
was unjustified. On the contrary, if the retrieval of thirteen knives under these
circumstances does not give rise to objective reasonable suspicion that the vehicle
occupants may be armed and dangerous, it is difficult to imagine any
circumstances that would. Contrary to the court of appeals' holding, the
retrieval of the thirteen knives is just the kind of obvious articulable fact that
14

makes the determination of reasonable suspicion easier. The majority's unsound
opinion should therefore be reversed.
ARGUMENT
L
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION
AND APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS TO
THE PERMISSIBLE LENGTH AND SCOPE OF DETENTION OF
PASSENGERS IN A LAWFULLY STOPPED VEHICLE.
There is no dispute here that the initial seizure of defendant, a passenger in a
vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment California v. Brendlin, 127 S.Ct. 2400,2407 (2007) (recognizing "[i]t is
reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime,
arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could
jeopardize his safety"). The question on certiorari is how long a passenger seized
incident to a traffic stop may reasonably be detained.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to specifically address this issue.
See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,415 n.3 (1997). In Wilson, the Supreme Court
held that officers "may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of
the stop," but declined to "go further and hold that an officer may forcibly detain a
passenger for the entire duration of the stop," because that issue was "not presented
by [the] case." Id. But the Supreme Court's clear concern for officer safety,
15

expressed most recently in Brendlin, supports the view that passengers are
reasonably detained until all the lawful objectives of the traffic stop are completed.
Indeed, Brendlin—together with the Supreme Court's prior opinions—"reflects a
societal expectation of 'unquestioned [police officer] command'" during a traffic
stop. Id. at 2407 (discussing Wilson, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)) (brackets in original). Notwithstanding
the above, the court of appeals held that "from the moment the driver was placed
under arrest," there was "no lawful reason why the passengers were detained." Id.
at \ 12; see also id. at \ \ 10-11 (citing Brendlin and State v. James, 2000 UT 80,f10,13
P.3d576).
A "detention [incident to a traffic stop] 'must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop/" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,500 (1983) and Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20) (1968)). And the length and scope of the stop must be
"strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." Id. (case citation and quotation marks omitted). But where, as here, the
driver is arrested, the lawful purposes of the stop evolve—as a matter of law—to
include safely searching the passenger compartment of the vehicle. See New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); accord State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1203 (Utah
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1995) (recognizing Belton authorizes officers to search arrested person and "his or
her vehicle"); see also Aple Br. at 12-16,18-19 (discussing Wilson and Belton). The
court of appeals7 held that the officers should have released the passengers—
including returning their knives—before undertaking this indisputably lawful
objective. See Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f 19 (holding "Baker was unlawfully
detained from the moment the driver was placed under arrest"). Re-arming four
passengers under these circumstances would make an already dangerous situation
even more dangerous. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1049 (1983) (recognizing
that "roadside encounters between police [officers] and suspects are especially
hazardous"); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f f 23-29,78 P.3d 590 (recognizing
inherent dangerousness of all traffic stops). See also Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414
(recognizing danger even "greater when... passengers" also present). The Fourth
Amendment does not require this.
A. Officer safety concerns warrant detaining passengers until all the
lawful objectives of a traffic stop are completed.
It is well established that "[t]he touchstone of [any] analysis under the Fourth
Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security/" Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1964)). Reasonableness in this context
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"depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers/" Mimms, 434 U.S.
at 109 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 873, 878 (1975)); see also
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411. And in all events it is "'unreasonable to require that police
officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.'" Mimms, 434 U.S.
at 110 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 23).
Recent Supreme Court precedents make clear that officers making a stop or
arrest must be allowed to control the situation. As noted above, the Supreme Court
held in Wilson that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms—that a driver may be ordered
to exit a lawfully stopped vehicle—should be extended to include passengers.
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-15. The Supreme Court observed in Wilson, that Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), "offers guidance by analogy." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414.
In Summers, " a s . . . police officers were about to execute a warrant to search a
house for narcotics, they encountered [Summers] descending the front steps." 452
U.S. at 693. At the officers request, Summers assisted them in gaining entry. Id. He
was thereafter detained while the officers searched the house. Id. The Wilson Court
noted that "[t]he question in [Summers] depended 'upon a deteraiination whether
the officers had the authority to require [Summers] to re-enter the house and to
remain there while they conducted their search.'" Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting
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Summers, 452 U.S. at 695). The Wilson Court emphasized that "'no special danger to
the police [officers] [was] suggested by the evidence in [the Summers] record/" but
that "'the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction
that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy
evidence/" Id. (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702). Additionally, the "'[t]he risk of
harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation/" Id. (quoting Summers, 452 U.S.
at 703); see also Muehler v. Menu, 544 U.S. 93,98 (2005) (holding the officers' detention
of Mena in handcuffs for duration of warrant-supported search of premises she
occupied with others "was, under Summers, plainly permissible").
The Supreme Court's analogy to Summers in Wilson is instructive. Read
together with Mena, these cases support the principle that police officers may detain
persons that they encounter in premises they are lawfully entitled to search, until
the search is completed.
It is "too plain for argument" that the public's interest in officer safety "is both
legitimate and weighty." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; see also Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413
(noting "weighty interest in officer safety"). This important interest is of special
significance in cases like this one because, as noted above, "traffic stops may be
dangerous encounters." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413; see also Long, 463 U.S. at 1049
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("roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous"); Foley
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,298 (1978) (noting "the number of police officers wounded
or killed in the process of making inquiry in borderline, seemingly minor violation
situations" involving traffic infractions); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 (acknowledging the
"inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an
automobile"); accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, f f 23-29. And the "danger to an officer
from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the
driver in the stopped car." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414.
These precedents suggest that passengers are reasonably detained incident
to a traffic arrest until all the lawful objectives of the stop are completed,
including a search of the passenger compartment. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460
(1981); accord Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1203 (recognizing Belton authorizes officers to
search arrested person and "his or her vehicle").
The officer safety concerns underlying the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in cases like Mimms, Summers, Long, and Wilson
remain compelling today. In Long and Mimms, the Supreme Court relied on a
1963 study showing that "approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when
a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile." Long, 463 U.S. at
1048 n.13; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110. In Wilson, the Supreme Court relied on 1994
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statistics demonstrating that in that year 5,762 officers were assaulted and eleven
were killed during traffic pursuits and stops. See 519 U.S. at 413.
In the years since these cases were decided, the statistics on which the
Supreme Court relied have remained consistent. The most recent data reveals
that in 2006,6,490 officers were assaulted and eight were killed during traffic
pursuits or stops. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports:
Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, Tables 19 & 66 (2006) ("Uniform
Crime Reports") (found at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/tablel9.html &
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/table66.html). 5 More than 40% of those
assaults involved a dangerous weapon such as a gun or knife. See Uniform Crime
Reports, Table 71 (found at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/table71.html).
Utah law enforcement officers are not immune from this danger. See Sara
Israelsen-Hartley, Lehi Officer shot: Police kill woman who opened fire, Deseret News,
24 June 2008, and Melinda Rogers and Nate Carlisle, Woman killed after shooting

5

All eight of the murdered officers were killed during traffic violation stops.
See
Uniform
Crime
Reports,
Table
19
(http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/tablel9.html). Although the FBI has yet to
release final statistics for 2007, preliminary data show that eleven officers were
killed during traffic pursuits and stops that year. See Uniform Crime Reports, May 12,
2008 Press Release (http://www.fbi.gov/ pressrel/pressrel08/leoka051208.htm).
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Lehi cop had history of mental illness, The Salt Lake Tribune, 24 June 2008 (copies of
both articles are attached in addendum D).
Given the above, concerns about officer safety during traffic stops are
weighty. Years of data establish the extreme danger that knives and other easily
concealed weapons pose to officers making traffic stops, which danger is only
increased when passengers are also present. Therefore, a rule permitting officers
to detain passengers until the lawful objectives of the stop are completed,
including searching the passenger compartment incident to an occupant's arrest,
serves a vital public purpose.
As for the personal liberty side of the ledger, as recognized in Wilson, "the
case for passengers is in one sense stronger than that for the driver." 519 U.S. at
413. For example, "[t]here is probable cause to believe that the driver has
committed a minor vehicular offense, but there is no such reason to stop or
detain the passengers/' Id. But "the additional intrusion on the passenger is
minimal/' id. at 415, because, "as a practical matter, the passengers are already
stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle." Id. at 413. As further recognized in
Wilson, "the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary
reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that
evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop." Id. at
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414. Passengers will therefore be "every bit" as motivated as drivers "to employ
violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime." Id. Accordingly, allowing
officers to detain passengers until the passenger compartment is safely searched
incident to an occupants7 arrest minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and
vehicle occupants. Here, detaining passengers until after the passenger
compartment is safely searched allows officers to protect themselves from any
possible attack by released—and rearmed—passengers.
As noted, the Supreme Court specifically declined in Wilson to decide
whether "an officer may forcibly detain a passenger for the entire duration of the
stop." 519 U.S. at 415 n.3. However, a majority of jurisdictions have since read
Wilson to mean that those same safety concerns that justify police in ordering
passengers out of a stopped vehicle also justify police in ordering passengers to
remain in the vehicle during a traffic stop.6 See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 510
R3d 788,791 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding officer's safety concerns far outweighed
minimal intrusion of ordering passenger Sanders back into vehicle), cert, denied,
128 S.Ct. 2072 (2008); United States v. Williams, 419 F.3d 1029,1034 (9th Cir. 2005)
6

Even before Wilson, at least one state court had extended Mimms to
passengers, including law enforcement authority to order passengers "back inside
the vehicle for safety purposes." State v. Webster, 824 R2d 768,770 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991).
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(recognizing officers' "need... to exercise control over individuals encountered
during a traffic stop" justified ordering "passenger back into an automobile that
he voluntarily exited"), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 1081 (2005); Rogala v. District of
Columbia, 161 F.3d 44,53 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing "a police officer has the
power to reasonably control the situation by requiring a passenger to remain in a
vehicle during a traffic stop") (emphasis in original); United States v. Moorefield,
111 F.3d 10,12-13 (3rd Cir. 1997) (affirming "police officers lawfully ordered
passenger Moorefield to remain in the car and put his hands in the air while the
traffic stop was being conducted"); Carter v. State, 494 S.E.2d 108,109410 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1997) (recognizing passenger's "detention]... while the officer completes
the traffic stop" " is a minimal intrusion"); State v. Roberts, 943 P.2d 1249,1251
(Mont. 1997) (holding "Roberts was not unlawfully detained when Officer Punt
directed him to remain in the vehicle"); People v. Forbes, 728 N.Y.S.2d 64,66 (2001)
(holding "it is within the discretion of the police officers on the scene to decide
whether . . . to maintain the status quo by requiring the driver and passengers to
remain in the vehicle until the traffic stop is over"); State v. Shearin, 612 S.E.2d
371,378 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing "it is reasonable for an officer to
decide that it is safer to have an occupant of a vehicle remain temporarily in the
vehicle for the short duration of a lawful traffic stop"); State v. Hodges, 631
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N.W.2d 206,210 & n.l (S.D. 2001) (recognizing "[f]or officer safety, it is
reasonable to require the passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle to remain at
the scene until officer is able to assess the situation"); Harris v. Commonwealth, 500
S.E.2d 257,261 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing "the Fourth Amendment permits
the police to order the passengers to get out of the car pending the completion of
the stop"). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure §9.6(a), at 647 (4th ed.
2004) ("Common sense suggests that, in the ordinary traffic stop situation, the
officer is much better off (from the standpoint of ensuring against a surprise
attack by a passenger) if the passengers remain in the stopped vehicle while the
citation is prepared and other procedures incident to the stop are carried out").
But see Wilson v. State, 734 So.2d 1107,1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), cert, denied,
529 U.S. 1124 (2000).
None of the above cases involves a situation exactly like that here, where
officers are authorized to search the passenger compartment incident to a vehicle
occupant's arrest. But the officer safety concerns undergirding these cases
strongly support the principle that allowing police officers to detain passengers
until this indisputably lawful objective is completed is reasonable. As reiterated
by the Supreme Court in Brendlin, "'[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the
occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command
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of the situation.'"127 S.Ct. at 2407 ((quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414) (in turn
quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03)).
B. In any event, defendant's detention was supported by reasonable
suspicion that he may be armed and dangerous.
For the reasons stated in Point 1(A) of this brief, defendant was reasonably
detained until the officers could safely search the passenger compartment incident
to the driver's arrest, even absent independent reasonable suspicion. However,
although the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to detain defendant under
this circumstance, they had it. As will be shown below, defendant was lawfully
detained up until the time he was frisked, because the officers reasonably suspected
that he may be armed and dangerous.
In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the United States Supreme Court
upheld the protective search of Long's car, and by implication, the prior frisk of
his person, based on facts similar to this case. Long was investigated for a
possible DUI, after two officers watched him swerve off the road into a ditch. Id.
at 1035. Long met the approaching officers at the rear of his car, which was
protruding from the ditch. Id. at 1035-36. Long was initially unresponsive to the
officers requests for his license, but eventually turned and began walking toward
the open driver's side door of his car. Id. at 1036. "The officers followed Long
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and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of
the car." Id. The officers "stopped Long's progress and subjected him to a Terry
protective pat-down, which revealed no weapons." Id. The officers also searched
the interior of the passenger compartment for additional weapons, but instead
found marijuana. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the
circumstances "clearly justified [the officers] in their reasonable belief that Long
posed a danger if he were permitted to renter his vehicle." Id. at 1050.
Specifically, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]he hour was late and
the area rural." Id. Additionally, "Long was driving his automobile at excessive
speed, and his car swerved into a ditch. The officers had to repeat their
questions to Long, who appeared to be 'under the influence of some intoxicant."
Id. The Supreme Court noted that Long "was not frisked until the officers
observed that there was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long
was about to reenter." Id. Although the issue in Long was the propriety of the
officers' limited search of Long's car for weapons, the Supreme Court observed
that "[o]f course, [its] analysis would apply to justify the search of Long's person
that was conducted by the officers after the discovery of the knife." Id. at 1051
n.15.
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Similarly, here, when Officer Robertson first approached the stopped
vehicle he "noticed a knife in a leather sheath on the thigh of a passenger in the
back seat." Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f 3. Given Long, this observation gave rise
to reasonable suspicion for weapons frisks of the vehicle occupamts, including
defendant, who was one of three back seat passengers. See Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1036,1046,1050-51 (1983); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,373 (2003)
(noting "that 'a car passenger... will often be engaged in a common enterprise
with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the
evidence of their wrongdoing" (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,30405 (1999))).
Officer Robertson's observation of the knife in this case distinguishes it
from State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,78 P.3d 590, upon which the court of appeals
relies. See Baker, 2008 UT App 115, Tl 16-17 (discussing Warren). In Warren, this
Court declined to uphold the weapons frisk in part because the officer in that
case saw no weapons upon approaching Warren, or at any time during the traffic
stop. 2003 UT 36, Tl 2-7,13. Here, however, Officer Robertson, like the officers
in Long, saw the knife upon approaching the stopped vehicle. Baker, 2008 UT
App 115, f 3.
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The surrounding circumstances only added to reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle occupants may be armed and dangerous: The hour was late, the area was
dark, and Officer Robertson was outnumbered by the five vehicle occupants. See
R71-69. Officer Robertson's reasonable suspicion continued to escalate when he
learned the driver's license had been suspended for drugs, he found a knife on the
driver in a search incident to her arrest, and his two backup officers retrieved twelve
additional knives from the passengers. Id. Although up to three additional officers
were variously on the scene, the officers were always outnumbered by the five
vehicle occupants. Id. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (holding danger to officers
increases when passengers present). Finally, as recognized by this Court, traffic
stops are inherently dangerous. Warren, 2003 UT 36,f 32. Thus, considering the
totality of the circumstances, even prior to the drug-dog alerting on the passenger
compartment, the officers here had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant
may be armed and dangerous.7 Id. at % 14.
Given that any detention of defendant beyond the initial purpose of the traffic
stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, it was not for the court of appeals to
rr

The reasonableness of the weapons frisk of defendant, which was not ultimately
performed until after the drug-dog alerted on the passenger compartment, is
discussed in Point II of this brief.
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second-guess the officers as to the timing of the weapons frisk. Reviewing courts
should be wary of "allow[ing] the theoretical, sanitized world of [their] imagination
to replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day/7 Smith
v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343,347 (6th Cir. 1992). "What constitutes 'reasonable' action
may seem quite different to someone facing a possible assailant than to someone
analyzing the question at leisure." Id.; see also People v. Wilson, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1053,
1063 (1997) (recognizing "[a]ppellate courts have repeatedly emphasized it is
inappropriate for judges to second-guess on-the-spot decisions of officers in the
field"). Here, the officers reasonably deemed it safer to keep the passengers under
control inside the vehicle while waiting for the K-9 unit, rather than to attempt to
remove and frisk them even as the K-9 unit arrived and went to work.
In sum, the business incident to the arrest of the driver was not complete until
the passenger compartment was searched. Defendant was frisked before the officers
could safely search the passenger compartment. Therefore, defendant was lawfully
detained at the time he was frisked.

In any event, although not required,

defendant's detention was also justified by a reasonable suspicion that he may be
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armed and dangerous. Long, 463 U.S. at 1046,1050-51. The court of appeals opinion
should therefore be reversed.

The court of appeals focused its analysis on the approximately one-minute
period between the time driver was placed in the patrol car and the arrival of the K9 unit. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, Tl 12-13. Even assuming, as the court of appeals
did, that Officer Robertson finished processing the driver's arrest and that all the
knives were retrieved approximately one minute before the K-9 unit arrived, this
slight delay was de minimis. See, e.g.,United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998,1002 (8th
Cir. 2005) (holding thirty second to two minute detention for dog sniff was de
minimis); United States .v Carpenter, 406 F.3d 915, 916-17 (7th cir. 2005) (holding
possible five minute wait for drug-detection dog not unreasonable); Hugueley v.
Dresden Police Department, 469 F.Supp.2d 507,513 (W.D. Term. 2007) (upholding two
and one-half minute dog sniff); United States v. Herera Martinez, 354 F.3d 932, 934
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding "short detention for dog sniff after completion of traffic stop
[does not] violate the Fourth Amendment"), vacated on other grounds, Martinez v.
United States, 127 S.Ct. 1125 (2007); United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182
F.3d 643,649 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding thirty-second to two-minute detention for
dog sniff); State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623,630 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding post-traffic
stop dog sniff on ground Box "only slightly inconvenienced when he was further
detained for less than a minute while the dog sniffed his vehicle"); State v. Griffin,
949 So.2d 309,315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding in regard to suspicionless dog
sniff, that "[i]f any intrusion into [Griffin's] liberty interests occurred, it was de
minimis and, therefore, not unconstitutional"); State v. De La Rosa, 657 N.W.2d 683,
687 (S.D. 2003) (holding dog sniff conducted after traffic stop ended not
unreasonable because "sniffing activity was of short duration," or a"matter of
seconds").
(Footnote continued on next page).
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II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION
AND APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
RELATING TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH
SEARCHES FOR WEAPONS MAY BE CONDUCTED.
The reasonable suspicion that justified defendant's extended detention, see
Point 1(A), also justified the weapons frisk of his person. A majority of the court of
appeals' disagreed, however, holding that the confiscation of thirteen knives, among
other circumstances, did not support objective reasonable suspicion that defendant
may be armed and dangerous. Baker, 2008 UT App 115,f18 (holding "nothing
other than the knives gave police officers any reason to take precautionary steps");
see also id. at \ \ 20,29 (Thorne, J., concurring) (declining to address whether frisk
was justified for officer safety reasons, deeming it "illegal solely" because length and
scope of prior detention unreasonable).

In any event, the real question is by whether the officers were authorized
under the Fourth Amendment to detain defendant from the moment the driver was
placed under arrest until defendant was frisked. For the reasons set forth in the
body of this point, including weighty officer safety concerns, the officers were
justified in detaining defendant until the business incident to the driver's arrest,
including safely searching the passenger compartment, was completed. The
passenger compartment search was completed prior to defendant's frisk; therefore,
defendant was lawfully detained at the time. Alternatively, as set forth in Point II of
this brief, the officers were justified in detaining defendant during the traffic stop
because they reasonably suspected that he may be armed and dcingerous.
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As shown in Point I of this brief, for reasons of officer safety, officers exercise
''unquestioned command" over passengers during a traffic stop, Brendlin, 127 S.Ct.
at 2407 (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (in turn quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703)).
Nevertheless, a weapons frisk may not be conducted absent individual suspicion
that a detainee may be armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. The
reasonableness of a weapons frisk is evaluated objectively, according to the totality
of the circumstances. Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 14. "To determine reasonableness, a
court should question whether 'the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or search "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief" that the
action was appropriate/" Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). An officer's
subjective interpretation of the facts " is one of several possible articulable facts a
court may consider as part of the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 121. Finally,
"[c]ourts must view the articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to
divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each other." Id. at f 1 4 (citing
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274).
Here, as explained in Point 1(A) of this brief, the officers had reasonable
suspicion to believe that defendant may be armed and dangerous and the weapons
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frisk of his person was therefore justified.9 According to the court of appeals,
however, "nothing other than the knives gave police officers any reason to take
precautionary steps," and thus the weapons frisk of defendant was unjustified.
Baker, 2008 UT App 115, \ 18 (emphasis added). In so holding, the court of appeals
emphasized that (1) the knives were confiscated prior to the weapons frisk, (2) the
officers expressed no concern for their individual safety, and (3) and one officer
"admitted that 'the reasons that [the officers] decided to search... [defendant] was
not because [the officers] were afraid for [their] safety,'" but rather "'to search for
drugs and contraband.'" Baker, 2008 UT App 115, \ 18; see also id. at f 1 7 .
Contrary to the court of appeals' opinion, the totality of the circumstances in
this case gives rise to objective reasonable suspicion that defendant may be armed
and dangerous and that the weapons frisk of his person was therefore justified.
9

This term, the United States Supreme Court will consider whether police
officers may subject a passenger to a weapons frisk where, as here, the officers have
reasonable suspicion to believe the passenger is armed and dangerous, but where
the officers do not suspect that the passenger is or has committed a criminal offense:
In the context of a vehicular stop for a minor traffic infraction, may an
officer conduct a pat-down search of a passenger when the officer has
an articulable basis to believe the passenger might be armed and
presently dangerous, but has no reasonable grounds to believe that the
passenger is committing, or has committed a criminal offense.
Arizona v. Johnson, 07-1122. See http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/071122.htm.
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Warren, 2003 UT 36,f14 (reiterating pertinent query: "whether 'the facts available
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search "warrant a [person] of
reasonable caution in the belief" that the action was appropriate'" (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 21-22)).
The court of appeals' first rational for refusing to uphold the frisk was that the
knives were already confiscated when the frisk occurred, and thus, the knives did
not give rise to reasonable suspicion that defendant may be "'armed and presently
dangerous/" Baker, 2008 UT App 115,f17 (quoting Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 29). On
the contrary, the existence of the knives increased, rather than decreased, concerns
for officer safety. Just because defendant and the other passengers had relinquished
some knives, did not mean that they had relinquished all of their weapons, or that
the officers were bound to believe that they had. See, e.g., State v. Beach, 2002 UT
App 160, \ 11,47 P.3d 932 (recognizing officer not bound to accept Beach's innocent
explanation); State v. McLean, 1999 UT App 114U, 1999 WL 33244734, *3 (recognizing
officer "was not required to take the word of the driver that the weapons were
unloaded, nor did he have to wait for a passenger to make a threatening move
before he checked the weapons to assure his own safety"); see also State v. Applegate,
2008 UT 63,112,

P.3d

(recognizing officer "was not required . . . to rule out

innocent conduct").
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Moreover, if the confiscation of thirteen knives under these circumstances
does not give rise to objective reasonable suspicion that the vehicle occupants may
be armed and dangerous, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances that would.
For example, this Court declined to uphold the weapons frisk in Warren, 2003 UT 36,
in part, because the lone officer in that case testified that Warren "did nothing to
cause [him] to be alarmed and that he had no reason to believe that Warren was
armed and dangerous/' 2003 UT 36,132. As noted previously, however, the officer
in Warren saw no weapons upon approaching Warren, or at any time during the
traffic stop. Id. at 112-7. Cf. Long, 463 U.S. at 1046,1050-51 (upholding protective
search of Long's car, and by implication, prior frisk of his person incident to DUI
investigation, because it was late at night in a rural area and a hunting knife was
seen on car floor). Thus, in declining to uphold the frisk in Warren, this Court
recognized that "the case was a difficult one/' in part, because it "lackjed] the kind
of obvious articulable facts that would make the determination easier[.]" Warren,
2003 UT 36,1130,33. Given the thirteen knives ultimately relinquished to officers
here, this case, unlike Warren, does not lack obvious articulable facts that make the
determination easier. Id. at 113.
Additionally, the objective basis for concern here—the confiscated
knives— is made all the more reasonable after the drug-dog alerted on the rear
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driver's side passenger handle. The drug-dog alert reasonably suggested not
only that the driver's involvement in drugs may be ongoing, but that it may also
involve her passengers. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373 (noting "that 'a car passenger
. . . will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the
same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing"
(quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,304-05 (1999))). Although the exact
amount of drugs inside the vehicle was then unknown to the officers, "a [person]
of reasonable caution," Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 14 (case citation and quotation
marks omitted), would reasonably be concerned that the vehicle occupants
possessed the confiscated knives for nefarious, rather than innocuous, purposes.
See United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185,1195 (10th Cir. 2004) (frisk permissible,
as officer reasonably suspected defendant "involved in drug dealing," a crime
"typically associated with some sort of weapon").
The court of appeals' second rational for refusing to uphold the frisk was that
that the officers expressed no "heightened fear for their safety." Baker, 2008 UT App
115, 1 18. Defense counsel did elicit affirmations from Officers Bartell and
Robertson that they were not in subjective fear for their safety despite recovering the
large number of knives because the passengers' behavior had been non-threatening.
See R150:13, 31. But Officer Robertson also testified that officer safety is an ever37

present concern. R150:31. Officer Rockwood similarly testified that the passengers7
behavior had not alarmed him, but also emphasized that he remained concerned
about the large number of knives retrieved from the vehicle occupants. R150:21-23.
Moreover, Officer Robertson's and Officer Rockwood's testimony reasonably
suggests that the reason the officers were not subjectively fearful for their individual
safety—despite the unusual number of knives—was precisely because they were
taking appropriate safety precautions in confiscating the knives for the duration of
the traffic stop. Thus, as correctly recognized by the trial court, the knives, in
conjunction with the other circumstances of the stop, compelled the conclusion that
the weapons frisk was objectively reasonable, even if defendant was cooperative.
See R71-69.
Finally, the court of appeals' third rational for refusing to uphold the frisk
was that Officer Robertson was primarily motivated to search for drugs. Baker, 2008
UT App 115, % 18. The court of appeals erred by including the officers' subjective
motivations in the reasonable suspicion analysis: "[t]he officer's subjective
motivation is irrelevant." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); see also
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135 (holding traffic stop based on either observed violation, or
reasonable suspicion of violation, is constitutionally justified, "despite the officer's
motivations or suspicions that are unrelated to the traffic offense"); Warren, 2003 UT
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36,114 (holding reasonableness is determined by asking whether the facts available
at the time of the search would "'warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22)). It
is well established that the reasonableness of officer conduct is judged against an
objective standard. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,
137 (1978). Under this standard, as noted above, an officer's motivation for acting is
irrelevant See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding searches are examined "without regard
to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved"). An officer's
subjective understanding of the legal justification for acting is also irrelevant. Accord
Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding "the fact that the officer does not have the state of
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for
the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify that action"); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153
(2004)(same); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,813 (1996)(same); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,236 (1973) (holding "it is of no moment that [the officer]...
did not himself suspect that respondent was armed"); see also Applegate, 2008 UT 63,
*[ 20 (recognizing officer's "subjective understanding of the law is irrelevant).
In sum, if left intact, the court of appeals' decision forces police officers into a
Catch 22: they can choose to protect themselves and risk suppression of any
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contraband they discover during a weapons frisk, or they can choose not to protect
themselves and risk attack by armed detainees. This imsound holding should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the court of appeals'
opinion.
Respectfully submitted 17 September 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

//

•

DECKER

ssistant Attorney General
Counsel for Petitioner
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 20080351-SC

Luke Zachary Baker,
Defendant and Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
certiorari, filed on April 24, 2008.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 4 5 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issues:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or
application of the Fourth Amendment as to the permissible length
and scope of detention of passengers in a vehicle that police
have stopped.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or
application of the Fourth Amendment relating to the circumstances
under which searches for weapons may be conducted.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.
For The Court:
Dated

n-n-oy
Matthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 041403985
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER,
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained
by the State of Utah in the instant case. The Court having carefully considered the Motions and
Memoranda and in response to counsels' request for a decision based solely on the pleadings, now
makes the following Ruling and Order.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

The Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof on
December 13, 2004.

2.

The State filed its Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on December 27, 2004.

3.

The Defendant filed its Reply to the State's Response on January 10,2005.

4.

On February 9,2005, the Court held a Suppression Hearing, where testimony was presented
and oral arguments were made. The Court then took the matter under advisement.
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n.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The facts relied on herein were adducedfromtestimony at both the preliminary hearing and
the suppression hearing.

in,
ANALYSIS & RULING
1.

Initial Detention
First of all, police officers have considerable discretion to protect officer safety, including

having passengers exit a vehicle while the traffic stop is being conducted. Maryland v. Wilson, 519
U.S. 408,415(1997). This can logically be extended to pennitting officers to have passengers remain
inside the vehicle during the stop. However, the litmus test for whether an individual has been
detained "depends on when the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer
thinks the person is no longerfreeto leave." State v. PatefiekL 927 P.2d 655,659 (Utah App. 1996)
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, "the subjective intention of the [officer] is irrelevant except insofar as they may
have been conveyed to the [defendant]." U.S. v. MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544. 554 n.6 (1980). Such
a detention occurs when an "officer engages in conduct which a reasonable person would view as
threatening or offensive even if performed by another private citizen." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998
P.2d 274, 278 (Utah App. 2000). Hence, it is an objective test that balances the totality of the
circumstances that the alleged detainee is faced with. Finally, a canine sniff conducted during a
concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that
no individual has any right to possess, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes,
2

543 U.S.

(2005) (Slip Opinion).

Although the time line of this traffic stop is somewhat blurry, it appears that the stop was
initiated very early in the morning on September 30, 2004, that the K-9 was requested at 1:21 a.m.,
that the K-9 arrived at 1:34 a.m., and the Defendant was searched and arrested at 1:45 a.m. The
request for the K-9 coincided with the discovery that the driver's hcense had been suspended for
drugs. Notably, the Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the actual time length of
the stop or in connection with the K-9 request, etc.
The K-9 arrived soon after the driver was placed under arrest in the police car; the significance
of the K-9 is discussed infra. In sum, it was dark, extremely early in the morning, there were five
occupants, two knives had already been found, and the officers were dealing with the driver and her
arrest until the K-9 arrived. Furthermore, the officers never told the Defendant that he was not free
to leave, although he testified that he subjectively believed that (which is irrelevant). Under these
circumstances, the Defendant was not "detained" for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections to
be triggered.

2.

Canine Sniff
A positive alert by a police-trained drug-detecting canine "is sufficient to establish probable

cause" to search. U.S. v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999). The only exception to this general
rule seems to be if the dog has a poor accuracy record with a history of false alerts. U.S. v. Ludwig.
10 F.3d 1523, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1993). Officers with probable cause may conduct a warrantless
search of the passenger compartment of a car, including its occupants, pursuant to the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); U.S. v. Barbee. 968
3

DO

F.2d 1026,1030 (10th Cir. 1992).
In this case, the facts are undisputed that the K-9 unit, which responded to the scene 13
minutes after it was called, alerted to the exterior of the vehicle that the Defendant was traveling in.
Ironically, Defense Counsel argued at the Suppression Hearing that the canine sniff is legally
insufficient to establishing probable cause. This flies in the face of the aforementioned wellestablished case law, which holds the contrary position. Because the case law is clear and because
the Defendant has failed to challenge the canine's accuracy record, the Court finds that the Defendant
was properly searched incident to the probable cause derivedfromthe positive canine alert.

3.

Terry Frisk - Police Safety
The "danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers

in addition to the driver in the stopped car." Maryland, 519 U.S. at 414. Furthermore, "[w]here a
police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes
that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a cfrisk' or 'pat-down*
search of the individual to discover weapons that might be used against him." State v. Lafond, 68
P.3d 1043,1049 (Utah App. 2003) (citing State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985)) (emphasis
added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). An officer's reasonable belief that an individual
may be armed and dangerous is not necessarily assuaged by the Defendant's assurances. In State v.
McLean, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that the officer "was not required to take the word of the
driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did he have to wait for a passenger to make a threatening
move before he checked the weapons to assure his own safety." IcL, 1999 UT App. 114 ("not for
official publication").
4
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Officer Mike Bartell, who retrieved the knives, testified that he recovered about 12 knives
from the passengers, including a set of throwing knives. Officer Chris Lavar Rockwood, who arrived
to assist Officer Raymond Robertson, conducted the Terryfriskof the Defendant. Before conducting
thefrisk,Officer Rockwood had observed "quite a few," "more thanfive"knives that had been taken
from the vehicle and that they "ranged [in size]frompocket knives to large knives." He also admitted
that while there had been no overt threatsfromthe passengers, he still had a concern for officer safety
after observing the large number of knives.
In addition, Officer Robertson testified that it was a rare case to retrieve 12-13 knives from
a vehicle. The sheer number of knives alerted the officers that it was reasonable to conclude that
there might be other weapons. Officer Robertson testified that he is always concerned about officer
safety, though he personally had no fear at this scene for his own safety. Furthermore, the Court
emphasizes that it was dark, around 1:30 a.m., and there were a total offiveoccupants in the vehicle.
In sum, the Terryfriskof the Defendant did not occur until after:
a.

The driver had been placed under arrest,

b.

12-13 knives had been retrievedfromthe passengers and driver, including some large
knives,

c.

A police-trained drug-detection canine alerted to the trunk and the rear door of the
vehicle. The Court also notes that the Defendant was a passenger in the rear seat at
the time.

In light of these facts,frankly,it could not be much more clear that the officers reasonably
believed that the Defendant and the other passengers were armed and dangerous. When the police
initially approached the vehicle, they noted that one of the occupants in the back seat was armed with
5
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a large knife. Additionally, when the driver was searched incident to arrest for driving on a
suspended license, another knife was found on her. After the officers requested that the passengers
turn over any other knives they had on them, a total of 13 knives were recovered, including at least
onefromthe Defendant. The Defendant argues that after these additional knives were * Voluntarily"
produced, the police no longer had a reasonable belief that the Defendant was armed or dangerous.
However, this Court finds that such an argument fails to have any merit in the context of this traffic
stop. As a result, the officers conducted a proper Terryfriskof the Defendant.

IV.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.

Signed this

//*-

day of February, 2005.
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attorneys:
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Utah County Attorney
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State v. Baker
Utah App.,2008.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Luke Zachary BAKER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20060218-CA.
April 3, 2008.
Certiorari Granted July 11, 2008.
Background: Defendant was convicted on a conditional guilty plea in the Fourth District Court,
Provo Department, Lynn W. Davis, J., of possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone
and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free
zone, and defendant appealed denial of his motion
to suppress.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that:
(1) detention of defendant was not supported by
reasonable particularized suspicion of criminal
activity, and
(2) protective frisk of defendant was not objectively
reasonable.
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(Formerly HOkl 134(3))
An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application of the law to the
facts.
[2] Automobiles 48A €^>349(17)
48A Automobiles
48AVI1 Offenses
48AVTI(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
Length and Character Thereof Most Cited Cases
Detention of defendant, a car passenger, by police
officer who arrested car driver after traffic stop was
not supported by reasonable particularized suspicion of criminal activity on the part of passenger,
even though stop occurred in early morning hours,
the car contained three other passengers, and one of
the other passengers had a knife; officer's desire to
check the car for drugs did not require the presence
of passengers. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[3] Automobiles 48A €=>349(1)

Reversed and remanded.
Thome, J., filed a concurring opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 €=>1134.49(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110XXIV(L)4 Scope of Inquiry
110k 1134.49 Evidence
110k 1134.49(4) k. Illegally Obtained Evidence. Most Cited Cases

© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West.

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Automobiles 48A €^>349(10)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVH(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(10) k. What Is Arrest or

Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Seizure; Stop Distinguished. Most Cited Cases
When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the
driver of the car and the passengers are seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; thus,
both driver and passenger may challenge the constitutionality of the stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[41 Arrest 35 €=^68(4)
35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k68 Mode of Making Arrest
35k68(4) k. What Constitutes Seizure.
Most Cited Cases
A seizure occurs, for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[5] Arrest 35 €=^63.1
35 Arrest
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest
Without Warrant
35k63.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
When challenged, the state has the burden of proving the reasonableness of a police officer's actions
during an investigative detention. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
[6] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>61
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k60 Motor Vehicles
349k61 k. Expectation of Privacy. Most
Cited Cases
Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their
highly-regulated status, persons traveling in
vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than
they would have within a private dwelling, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.C.A,
ConstAmend. 4.

Page 2

[7] Arrest 35 €^>63.5(6)
35 Arrest
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Fnsk
35k63.5(6) k. Motor Vehicles, Stopping.
Most Cited Cases
Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, officers may temporarily detain a
vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a
limited investigation of the suspicion. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
[8] Arrest 35 €^>63.5(6)
35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Frisk
35k63.5(6) k. Motor Vehicles, Stopping.
Most Cited Cases
Arrest 35 €=^63.5(9)
35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Frisk
35k63.5(9) k. Duration of Detention and
Extent or Conduct of Investigation or Frisk. Most
Cited Cases
Articulable suspicion sufficient to justify temporary
warrantless detention of a vehicle and its occupants
must be that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime; however, the detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
[9] Arrest 35 €=>63.5(6)
35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Frisk
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35k63.5(6) k. Motor Vehicles, Stopping.
Most Cited Cases
In determining whether a temporary warrantless detention of a vehicle and its occupants was justified,
the articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion for the detention are usually grounded in an
officer's personal perceptions and inferences, but
may also include external information. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

35k68 Mode of Making Arrest
35k68(3) k. What Constitutes Arrest.
Most Cited Cases
The constitution, not the speed with which police
officers dispatch their duties, determines when an
arrest occurs, for purposes of determining whether
specific and articulable facts support reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory detention. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

[10] Arrest 35 €=>63.5(6)

[13] Arrest 35 €==>63.5(8)

35 Arrest
3 5II On Criminal Charges
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Frisk
35k63.5(6) k. Motor Vehicles, Stopping.
Most Cited Cases
In determining whether a temporary warrantless detention of a vehicle and its occupants was justified,
courts look to the totality of the circumstances to
determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Frisk
35k63.5(8) k. Justification for Arrest or
Pat-Down Search. Most Cited Cases
Police officer's protective frisk of defendant, a car
passenger, was not objectively reasonable; even
though 13 knives were recovered from car, the
knives had been volunteered to officer while the
passengers waited to be on their way, the knives
had already been confiscated at the time the frisk
was performed, the frisk was only done after a police dog indicated the presence of drugs, and officers testified that they did not fear for their safety
and that the purpose of the frisk was to search for
drugs and contraband. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[11] Arrest 35 €==>63.5(9)
35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Frisk
35k63.5(9) k. Duration of Detention and
Extent or Conduct of Investigation or Frisk. Most
Cited Cases
Investigative acts that are not reasonably related to
dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for a
stop under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement are permissible only if they do not add
to the delay already lawfully experienced and do
not represent any further intrusion on the detainee's
rights. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[14] Arrest 35 €=^63.5(8)
35 Arrest
3 5II On Criminal Charges
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Frisk
35k63.5(8) k. Justification for Arrest or
Pat-Down Search. Most Cited Cases
The sole purpose of a Terry frisk is to protect the
officer by neutralizing potential weapons. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

[12] Arrest 35 €^>68(3)
[15] Arrest 35 €=>63.5(9)
35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges

35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges

' 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

.—^o„+;^-o/7kOT7n/:A

A I?T7 T\QCH /ICAC D K A

r^

A M /OAAQ

182P.3d935
182 P.3d 935, 601 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 2008 UT App 115

35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Frisk
35k63.5(9) k. Duration of Detention and
Extent or Conduct of Investigation or Frisk. Most
Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €=>394.4(13)
110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(1) Competency in General
110k394 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394.4 Unlawful Search or Seizure
110k394.4(13) k. Persons. Most
Cited Cases
If a protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no
longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[16] Arrest 35 €=>63.5(8)
35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop- And-Frisk
35k63.5(8) k. Justification for Arrest or
Pat-Down Search. Most Cited Cases
An officer's subjective interpretation that a person
may be armed and dangerous, like an officer's subjective interpretation of the facts to determine that a
crime has been or is being committed, is one of several possible articulable facts a court may consider
as part of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a protective search is justified
under Terry. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
*936 Aaron P. Dodd, Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Arty. Gen., and Marian Decker,
Asst. Arty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before THORNE, Associtae P.J., DAVIS, and
ORME, JJ.

OPINION
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DAVIS, Judge:
U 1 Appellant Luke Zachary Baker entered a Sery
plea after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. See generally State v. Sery, 758 P 2d 935,
937-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Baker contends that
the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because, he asserts, from the moment the officers placed the driver under arrest, Baker, a passenger in the driver's vehicle, was unlawfully detained. We agree, and thus reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND ™
FN1. "We recite the facts in detail because
the legal analysis in a search and seizure
case is highly fact dependent." State v.
Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ 2, 78 P.3d 590
(citing State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 5,
63 P.3d 650).
| 2 In the early morning hours of September 30,
2004, Baker was riding in the backseat*937 of a car
traveling through Pleasant Grove, Utah. Pleasant
Grove Police Officer Raymond Robertson noticed
the car's license plate was not illuminated. Accordingly, he initiated a traffic stop.
| 3 As he approached the vehicle, Officer
Robertson noticed a knife in a leather sheath on the
thigh of a passenger in the back seat. At approximately 1:21 a.m., Officer Robertson ran a warrants
check on the driver and discovered that her license
had been "suspended for drugs." Officer Robertson
then called for a K-9 unit to check the vehicle for
controlled substances. Officer Robertson testified at
the preliminary hearing that there was "no other
reason" for requesting the K-9 unit. After he finished talking to dispatch, Officer Robertson walked
back to the vehicle and proceeded to arrest the driver.
H 4 Responding to dispatch, additional officersPleasant Grove Police Officer Mike Bartell and Orem City Police Officer Chris Rockwood-arrived on
the scene to assist Officer Robertson. By the time

»2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Officer Bartell arrived, the driver was already out
of the vehicle and under arrest. Officer Robertson
informed the other officers of the knife, and Officer
Bartell proceeded to seize the knife while Officer
Robertson processed the driver.
f 5 Officer Bartell then spoke to the backseat passenger whom Officer Robertson had seen with the
knife. This passenger volunteered that he had a
knife sitting on his thigh. Officer Bartell responded
that he "better take the knife until we fmish up with
the stop." Officer Bartell then asked the passengers
if there were any more knives in the car. The passengers, including Baker, then handed Officer Bartell approximately twelve other knives, including a
set of throwing knives. Officer Bartell testified at
the suppression hearing that none of the passengers
said or did anything to make him fear for his safety
once the knives were confiscated. Officers Rockwood and Robertson concurred with this assessment. Yet Officer Robertson testified at the preliminary hearing that the passengers were not free to
leave until the K-9 unit arrived.
f 6 At approximately 1:33 a.m., Officer Robertson
placed the driver in the back of his patrol car, and
at 1:34 a.m., Orem City Police Officer Art Lopez
arrived with a police service dog. At this time,
Baker and his three remaining riding companions
were still seated in the vehicle with the engine
turned off. The dog then sniffed around the car and
indicated that it smelled drugs. Accordingly, Officer Rockwood frisked the passengers and found a
glass pipe in Baker's pants pocket and another in
his shoe. At the suppression hearing, Officer
Robertson testified that the reason the officers
searched Baker was not because they were afraid
for their safety, but was instead because they
wanted to check for drugs and contraband. Baker
was then placed in handcuffs and taken to the police station. In the process of booking Baker, police
officers found a bag containing seventy-one grams
of methamphetamine.
K 7 Baker was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone and possession
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of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone. Baker
moved to suppress the evidence of the glass pipes
and methamphetamine. After a hearing, the trial
court denied Baker's Motion to Suppress. The trial
court ruled that given the lateness of the hour, the
number of passengers, the number of knives, and
the ongoing arrest of the driver, Baker "was not
'detained' for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Using the same set of facts, with the addition of the K-9 unit's detection of drugs, the trial
court similarly ruled that "it could not be much
more clear that the officers reasonably believed that
[Baker] and the other passengers were armed and
dangerous." FN: Baker now appeals the denial of
his Motion to Suppress.
FN2. The trial court also stated that Baker
"[did] not make any attenuation challenge
to the actual time length of the stop or in
connection with the K-9 request, etc."
However, Baker preserved his challenge to
the unlawful nature of the detainment in
his Motion to Suppress, stating that "[h]e
was detained without either probable cause
or reasonable suspicion, both before and
after the K-9 unit arrived."
*938 ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] f 8 Baker argues that the trial court erred by
denying his Motion to Suppress. "On review of
both criminal and civil proceedings, we accept the
trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,
1172 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Ison, 2006 UT
26, % 22, 135 P.3d 864 (defining a factual finding).
"We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress for correctness, without deference to the
trial court's application of the law to the facts."
Lay ton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, % 11, 139
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, <[ 15,
103P.3d699).FN3
FN3. Baker also contends that even if the
trial court properly ruled on the suppression motion respecting the Fourth Amend-
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ment, we should reverse because the police
officers' actions violated Baker's rights under article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. I, § 14. Because Baker makes this argument for the
first time on appeal, we decline to address
it. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1216
(Utah 1993) ("Utah appellate courts generally will not address a state constitutional
argument made for the first time on appeal").
ANALYSIS
f 9 Baker argues that he was unlawfully detained
from the moment the driver was arrested and that
he was illegally frisked. We analyze each argument
separately.

I. The Detention
[2][3][4][5] H 10uWhen a police officer makes a
traffic stop, the driver of the car [and the passengers are] seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." Brendlin v. California, — U.S. — ,
— , 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2403, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007).
Thus, both driver and passenger "may challenge the
constitutionality of the stop." Id "[A] seizure occurs if 'in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.' "Id. at
2405 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497
(1980)); accord State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767
(Utah Ct.App.1990). "When challenged, the [S]tate
has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
officer's actions during an investigative detention."
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, % 23, 164 P.3d 397
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-500,
103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United
States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 & n. 2 (10th
Cir.1994)).
[6][7][8][9][10][11] J 11 "Due to the mobile nature
of vehicles and their highly-regulated status, per-

Page 6

sons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation
of privacy than they would have within a private
dwelling." State v. James, 2000 UT 80, «| 10, 13
P.3d 576. And "officers may temporarily detain a
vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a
limited investigation of the suspicion." ht This
"articulable suspicion" must be "that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however
the detention must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18
(Utah 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ] 15, 107
P.3d 706 ("No person may be detained except upon
reasonable suspicion, and the scope of the detention
must be limited to addressing the articulated
grounds for the stop."). "The articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion are usually grounded
in an officer's personal perceptions and inferences"
but may also include external information. Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231. 234 (Utah
Ct.App.1997). "[W]e 'look to the totality of the circumstances ... to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity.' "State v.
Beach, 2002 UT App 160, K 8, 47 P.3d 932
(omission in original) (quoting State v. Humphrey,
937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah CtApp.1997)).
"Investigative acts that are not reasonably related to
dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for
the stop are permissible only if they do 'not add to
the delay already lawfully experienced' and do 'not
represent any further intrusion on [the detainee's]
rights.' "Chism, 2005 UT App 41, TJ 15, 107 P.3d
706 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see
also United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561
(10th Cir.1994) (finding the detention unlawful
once the officer had discovered that *939 detainee's
car's registration sticker "was valid and had not expired"); Chum, 2005 UT App 41, T 17, 107 P.3d
706 (determining that continued detention of a defendant was unlawful when the officer provided
"no specific, articulable facts supporting his unwillingness to accept the date of birth on [the defendant's] license"); State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App
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256,1R| 19-20, 76 P 3d 178 (holding that detaining a
motorist on suspicion of intoxicated driving after
successful performance of field sobriety tests was
unlawful, and therefore unreasonable)
[12] f 12 Here, the State, citing Maryland v
Pringle 540 L S 366 124 S Ct 795, 157 LEd2d
769 (2003), argues that the K-9 unit search was part
and parcel of the traffic stop and hence Baker was
not unlawfully detained However, the driver was
arrested well before the K-9 unit arrived Placmg
her in the patrol car, which occurred only a minute
before the K-9 unit was on the scene, was, at best, a
ministerial act We see no lawful reason why the
passengers were detamed while the officers awaited
the arrival of the K-9 unit The constitution, not the
speed with which police officers dispatch then" duties, determines when an arrest occurs Cf Norwood, 2007 UT 47 H 24 n 31, 164 P 3d 397
U 13 Moreover, the desire to check the vehicle for
controlled substances did not require the presence
of the passengers,rM yet Officer Robertson admitted that the passengers were not free to leave while
the K-9 unit was en route Thus, the officers needed
some reasonable articulable suspicion to lawfully
detain Baker and the other passengers while awaiting the K-9 umt's arrival At the time Officer
Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had
seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and
not in Baker's possession) While it was the early
morning hours, and there were four passengers in
the car, nothing m the officers' testimony mdicates
any particularized suspicion involving cnmmal
activity on the part of the passengers, thus, continued detention was impermissibleFNb See State v
Chapman, 921 P 2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996)
(determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when "[b]y the officers'
own testimony, no mdependent facts surrounding
the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was mvolved in any illegal activity
beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]"), cf
Pi ingle 540 U S
at 373, 124 S Ct 795
(determining that the large amount of money and
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drugs in the car made it "reasonable for the officer
to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the
three [occupants of the car]"), Vmttd States v Di
Re, 3^2 U S 581, ^93-94, 68 S Ct 222 92 L Ed
210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have
no evidence or information implicating a suspect,
"mere presence" m the car does not give officers
probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved m a crime) Accordmgly, we hold that
Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was
m violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and
that all evidence subsequently recovered must be
excluded See State v Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 1 62,
63 P 3d 650, State v Larocco 794 P 2d 460, 472
(Utah 1990)
FN4 We note that Illinois \ Caballes, 543
U S 405, 125 SCt 834 160 LEd2d 842
(2005), in which a dog sniff was upheld as
constitutional, is distinguishable from the
present case because the K-9 officer m
Caballes arrived and walked his dog
around the car while an officer "was m the
process of writing a warning ticket,"/^ at
406, 125 S Ct 834 The Court recognized
that "[a] seizure that is justified solely by
the interest in issumg a warning ticket to
the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the tune reasonably required to complete that mission" Id at
407, 125 S Ct 834 The Court went on to
contrast the facts in Caballes with those of
People v Cox 202 111 2d 462, 270 111 Dec
81, 782 N E 2 d 275 (2002), where "a dog
sniff
occurred during an unreasonably
prolonged traffic stop," which the Court
determined to be "an unconstitutional
seizure" Caballes, 543 U S at 407-08,
125 S Ct 834 Also, Caballes did not involve passengers See id at 406, 125 S Ct
834 Accordingly, the Caballes holdmg
does not apply to the present case
FN5 The record does not suggest, and the
State does not contend, that possession of
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the knives was itself illegal.
II. The Frisk
[13] f 14 The State argues that even if the officers
had no reasonable articulable suspicion of any
criminal activity on the part of the passengers, the
frisk of Baker was *940 warranted because, as the
trial court ruled, "the officers reasonably believed
that [Baker] and the other passengers were armed
and dangerous." This ruling by the trial court was
based on the following findings: it was dark, it was
late at night, the driver had been arrested, there
were four passengers who had been in possession of
approximately thirteen knives, and a K-9 unit had
detected controlled substances where the three passengers (including Baker) sat.
[14][15][16] f 15 "The sole purpose" of a Terry
frisk "is to protect the officer ... by neutralizing potential weapons." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^
13, 78 P.3d 590 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1049 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201
(1983); Tenv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).FN6 " Tf a protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid
under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.' "Id.
(quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,
373, 113 S.Ct 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)).
"When probable cause is required, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has held that a lack of subjective belief cannot invalidate an otherwise objectively reasonable action." Id. 1[ 16. An officer's subjective interpretation that "a person may be armed and dangerous, like an officer's subjective interpretation of
the facts to determine that a crime has been or is
being committed, is one of several possible articulable facts a court may consider as part of the totality of the circumstances." Id. % 21.
FN6. Although society's interest in promoting officer safety is great, that interest
must be weighed against society's interest
in protecting individual liberty.... Balancing these interests, courts have held that
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slight intrusions such as ordering a person
out of a car or conducting background
checks pursuant to a traffic stop are justifiable intrusions in order to allow officers to
operate in safety. A Terry frisk is an intrusion of a greater magnitude.
State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36, t 25, 78
P.3d 590 (citations omitted) (discussing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 1868,
20L.Ed.2d889(1968)).
K 16 In State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 78 P.3d 590, a
police officer "testified that he did not have any
reason to believe that [the defendant] was armed.
He also testified that [the defendant] did not do
anything that caused him any concern." Id. ^ 6. Yet
the officer frisked the defendant for weapons. See
id. The officer testified that he frisked the defendant "to promote the safety of officers and others"
and that he performed such frisks "as a matter of
routine on anyone he orders out of a vehicle." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court held that such a frisk violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. ^ 33 ("[T]he
officer's safety concerns in this case were not sufficient to outweigh [the defendant's right to personal
security."). Moreover, the court observed that "[i]n
simple traffic stops where other indicia of dangerousness are absent, ordering the occupants of the
vehicle out of the car clearly mitigates the inherent
dangerousness of the stop." Id. f 27.
^[17 Here, the State attempts to distinguish Wairen
by pointing to the number of knives that officers recovered from the passengers, including Baker, at
the outset. However, in this particular situation, the
mere presence of the knives, which had been confiscated at the time the officers decided to search
the passengers, is not a "specific and articulable
fact[ ] which, taken together with the rational inferences from [that] fact[ ], would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the suspect may be armed
and presently dangerous." See id. ^ 29 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
f 18 Looking at the totality of the circumstances,
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nothing other than the knives gave police officers
any reason to take precautionary steps. Even the
most potentially threatening aspect of the stop-the
many knives-demonstrates the lack of an objective
danger. According to Officer Bartell's testimony,
the knives were volunteered to him while the passengers were waiting to be on their way. Tellingly,
the Terry frisk was not conducted until well after
the officers collected the knives and only after the
K-9 unit indicated the presence of drugs in the
backseat of the vehicle. Perhaps this is why Officer
Robertson admitted that "the reason that [the officers] decided to search ... Baker was not because
[the officers] were afraid for [their] safety." In fact,
all three officers testified as to having no
heightened fear for their safety. *941 Rather, as
Officer Robertson admitted, u[t]he reason [the officers] did [the Teny frisk] was to search for drugs
and contraband." Thus, we determine that the
factors supporting the reasonableness of the frisk
are insufficient and that the frisk violated Baker's
constitutional rights.
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US. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
\ 22uThe constitutionality of a search and seizure is
determined by answering two questions: '(1) Was
the police officer's action justified at its inception?
and (2) Was the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place?' "Layton City v.
Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, % 14, 139 P.3d 281
(quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32
(Utah 1994)). Until recently, there was some question about whether and when a private vehicle's
passengers are deemed detained during an ordinary
traffic stop. Last year, the Supreme Court answered
that question in Brendlin v. California, — U.S. — ,
127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007), holding
that a passenger in a private vehicle that is pulled
over by police is "seized from the moment [the] car
[comes] to a halt on the side of the road,"*rf. at
2410, and suggesting that the seizure continues until police indicate that the passenger is free to go,
see id. at 2406-07 ("[A]ny reasonable passenger
would have understood ... that no one in the car was
free to depart without police permission.").™1

CONCLUSION
K 19 We hold that Baker was unlawfully detained
from the moment the driver was placed under arrest. Similarly, we hold that the mere presence of
the already-confiscated knives did not tip the scales
in favor of an objectively reasonable concern for
officer safety. We reverse and remand.
\ 20 I CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME,
Judge.THORNE, Judge (concurring):
U 21 I do not disagree with the majority opinion's
determination that Baker was unlawfully frisked
and that the contraband discovered on his person
should be suppressed. I write separately, however,
to clarify that I view the frisk as illegal solely because the length and scope of Baker's detention prior to the frisk was unreasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, I would simply disallow the
frisk as a fruit of an unlawful detention without addressing whether it might be justified as a Teny
frisk for weapons. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392
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FN1. In this case, not only did the police
officers not inform Baker that he was free
to go, they took at least one knife from him
and retained it over the course of the stop.
Police retention of personal property alone
may be sufficient to establish a seizure under our existing case law. See, eg., Salt
Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ffi[
14-17, 998 P.2d 274 (explaining that, generally, a person is seized while the police
hold their identification papers or other
property). Accordingly, the police actions
in this case provide an independent basis
for concluding that Baker was seized for
the duration of the stop.
% 23 Returning to the two-part analysis described in
Lavton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, ^ 14, 139
P.3d 281, I believe that it is implicit in the Brendlin
opinion that this seizure of a vehicle's passengers is
justified at its inception so long as the vehicle stop
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itself is justified. See generally Brendlin, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2400. In the present case, the vehicle
stop was supported by probable cause of a traffic
violation and was clearly valid. Accordingly, I
would deem Baker's seizure justified at its inception.

was no possibility that Baker would shortly be allowed to continue on his way as the driver's passenger because the driver was not going to be allowed
to leave. This significant change in the nature of the
stop created, in my opinion, some obligation on the
part of the officers to address the passengers' situation as unwilling detainees, with the ultimate result of informing the passengers in a timely manner
that they were free to go.

K 24 The question then turns to whether Baker's
continued detention was " 'reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.' "Layton City, 2006 UT
App 244, % 14, 139 P.3d 281 (citation omitted). In
the context of a passenger detained solely as a result of a driver's traffic violation, this is not necessarily a simple question to answer. At one extreme,
it could be said that the passenger's continued detention is not related in any way to the driver's
traffic violation, and thus, the passenger's detention
becomes illegal unless the officer informs the passenger, at the officer's earliest convenience, that the
passenger is free to go. The other extreme is argued
by the State in this case: that a passenger is legitimately detained so long as the driver is legitimately
detained, however *942 long that might be. I do not
subscribe to either of these positions and instead
conclude that the validity of the passenger's detention, like most search and seizure questions, must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis looking at the
totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., State v.
Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, K 51, 156 P.3d 771
(examining " 'all of the circumstances surrounding
the search or seizure and the nature of the search or
seizure itself " (quoting United States v. Montova
de Hernandez. 473 U.S. 531, 537, 105 S.Ct. 3304,
87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985))); State v. Marquez, 2007
UT App 170, f 11, 163 P.3d 687 ("[T]he reasonableness of any warrantless search must be determined on a case-by-case basis with the focus on the
totality of the circumstances.").

K 26 I express no opinion on how the police might
fulfill this obligation in any particular case, or how
rapidly they must do so. I note that police officers
must have significant latitude to do their jobs and
that I would not ordinarily find constitutional violations to be created by a few seconds, or even a few
minutes, of variation in police practice from one
stop to the next. Others may disagree. See State v.
Adams, 2007 UT App 117. % 19, 158 P.3d 1134
(Orme, J., dissenting) ("If football is a game of
inches, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be a
matter of seconds."), cert denied,l6S P.3d 1264
(Utah 2007). In this case, however, the police took
no actions aimed at releasing the passengers over
the ten to fifteen minutes between the driver's arrest
and the drug dog's alert.
^ 27 It is also relevant that the facts of this case
suggest that Baker and the other passengers were
being detained solely to await the arrival of the
drug-sniffing dog. There seems to be no reason for
their detention besides a desire that the dog screen
the vehicle and all of its occupants for illegal drugs.
Absent some separate justification for detaining
Baker and the other passengers, each passenger's
detention must be justified by individualized suspicion of the criminal behavior being investigated
during the detention-in this case, possession of
drugs.™2 I see no such individualized suspicion
here. A passenger's mere presence in a vehicle driven by one whose driver license has been suspended
because of drugs does not equate to reasonable suspicion that the passenger is involved 'with drugs.
Cf. State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah
CtApp.1993) (stating that a convicted drug user's

f 25 I agree with the majority opinion that, under
the circumstances of this case, police detention of
Baker was not justified once the decision to arrest
the driver was made. At that point, a brief traffic
stop had turned into an indefinite detention. There
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presence in a home is "not properly part" of the
probable cause analysis required to justify a search
warrant for drugs in the home). The State points to
no other grounds for reasonable suspicion that
Baker had drugs, and his detention for the sole purpose of being screened for drug possession was
therefore impermissible.
FN2. The drug sniff of the driver and his
car was likely entirely proper. See Illinois
v. Caballes. 543 U.S. 405, 406-08, 125
S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)
(upholding dog sniff of stopped vehicle so
long as it does not extend otherwise legitimate stop). The driver had been taken into
custody, and the delay pending the arrival
of the drug dog did not extend his detention in any way. By contrast, if the passengers would otherwise have been allowed to
proceed on their way, then their compelled
presence pending the dog's arrival did extend their detention and must be justified
by individualized reasons for doing so.
% 28 In sum, a passenger who silently submits to
police authority by remaining in a lawfully stopped
vehicle is seized, but permissibly so in my opinion.
See generally Brendlin v. California, — U.S. — ,
127 S.Ct 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). And, so
long as the stop is likely to be resolved in a reasonably short period of time and the focus of the detention is solely on the driver, I see no per se unreasonableness in the passenger's secondary detention.
Here, however, *943 the driver's detention had effectively become permanent, and the investigatory
scope of the detention had widened to include
Baker as a target. Without some reason to independently suspect Baker of wrongdoing, this detention of Baker was unreasonable and represents a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
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accede to it on officer safety grounds. See State v.
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 13, 78 P.3d 590 ("[A]n officer may perform a protective frisk pursuant to a
lawful stop when the officer reasonably believes a
person is *armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others.' " (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))).
Various factors might support a reasonable belief
that Baker and his companions presented an armed
danger to the officers conducting the stop-they outnumbered the police and were in possession of an
unusually large array of knives, it was late at night,
and at least the driver had some previous criminal
involvement.
% 30 Nevertheless, the frisk in this case was not
timely performed, but rather occurred after a substantial period of unlawful detention resulting from
an unjustified desire to await the arrival of the
drug-detection dog. As such, I believe it must be
suppressed as the poisonous fruit of that unlawful
detention even if it might have been justified if performed earlier in the stop. See State v. Worwood.
2007 UT 47, % 50, 164 P.3d 397 (rejecting the "if
we hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it
right" defense of unconstitutional searches and
seizures). For these reasons I concur in the result
reached by the majority, but with the clarifications
and reservations expressed herein.
Utah App.,2008.
State v. Baker
182 P.3d 935, 601 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 2008 UT App
115
END OF DOCUMENT

% 29 I would end the analysis at this point and reverse the trial court's suppression ruling. I see no
reason to additionally address whether Baker's frisk
was justified for officer safety reasons. If such a
frisk had been timely performed, I might very well
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Addendum D

Deseret News
Lehi officer shot: Police kill woman who opened fire
By Sara Xsraelsen-Hartley
Deseret News
Pu&'stod J'tho 24 s&OS

LEHI — Lehi police officers and city officials are reeling from a shooting Monday morning that
sent a veteran police captain to the hospital and brought back memories of the last officer they
lost.
Just before 9 a.m., police Capt. Harold Terry pulled over a female driver suspected of being
impaired, after a gas-station clerk called 911 to report the woman had exhibited slurred speech
and poor balance.
After a short disagreement at the car window, the 34-year-old woman, who was still seated in
the car, suddenly fired twice with a .38-caliber revolver, hitting Terry twice in the left side of the
head, just above his ear. Terry was able to draw his gun and fire once into the car and back-up
officers on scene fired five rounds at the woman, killing her.
One bullet exited Terry's head and the other bullet and shrapnel were surgically removed late
Monday morning at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, where he was reported to be resting
in stable condition, surrounded by family and friends, said Lehi Police Sgt. Darren Paul.
"This is a trying time for all of us. WeYe all very close," Paul said, as he stood in front of the
police station that bears the name of the last officer they lost — Lt. Joseph Adams. Like Terry,
Adams had also stopped a suspected impaired driver when he was killed in August 2001.
The woman fatally shot Monday morning is from Washington state but was living in Provo and
attending school in Utah County.
Police have not released her name pending notification of her family.
Officers cannot find any indication that the woman has a criminal record, nor do they believe
she was the subject of a warrant. They will be conducting an autopsy and toxicology reports
and searching her car to determine what may have caused her behavior, Paul said.
A combined group of investigators and officials from the Utah County Attorney's Office will be
reviewing the use of force by the Lehi officers.
"Traffic stops are considered the most dangerous encounters officers face," Paul said. "There
are so many unknowns."
Terry had followed the proper protocol for the stop at 1000 E. Main, in front of a busy gas
station, Paul said.
"He's a veteran leader here," Paul said. "He's very well respected and professional in how he
carries out his duties."
Although police captains are often found in an office behind a desk, Terry was out on the road
and responded when he heard the dispatch report.
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"Knowing Capt. Terry, I'm not a bit surprised," Paul said. "He leads by example."
Terry has been with Lehi for 16 years and was promoted in February to captain over the patrol
division, Paul said.
As well as leading by example, Terry also trained and taught officers.
He had just finished teaching one term of law enforcement operations at Provo College, which
focuses on the day-to-day life of a police officer, said Ken Peay, program administrator for the
criminal justice degree at Provo College.
"Harold was an excellent teacher," Peay said. "He was really, really good with his students. I
think he exemplifies the best of the best," Peay said.
Terry had taken the summer semester off but planned to come back in the fall, Peay said.
"He loved it," Peay said. "He was really good at it, you could tell how much he enjoyed it
because of his demeanor in the classroom.... He made the classes come to life with his
experiences."
Several students have called wanting to send messages or flowers to the family, Peay said.
One of the experiences Terry shared with students included being involved in a shoot-out with a
former police comrade, Art Henderson, who had chased his ex-wife and her boyfriend through a
residential Lehi neighborhood, firing several shots at them in January 2006.
Lehi officers took Henderson down with several shots to the leg, and he was arrested.
Henderson was later charged with numerous felonies, including attempted aggravated murder,
but his criminal case ended in April 2006 when he hanged himself in a cell at the Salt Lake
Metro Jail.
"It's hard to think that these men and women put their lives on the line," said Lehi Mayor
Howard H. Johnson, who stopped by the station to share his love and support with the force.
Johnson, too, mentioned Adams when he talked about Monday's shooting. The poignant
memory of the fallen officer is something no one has forgotten.
In the August 2001 shooting, Adams found a bag of cocaine in a car he had pulled over, told
the driver he was under arrest and began to handcuff him. Somehow the driver got one hand
free, grabbed a handgun from his belt and shot Adams.
Although wounded in two places, Adams was able to return fire, hitting the man multiple times.
With a handcuff dangling from one wrist, the shooter, Arturo Javier Scott Welch, got in his car
and drove away, according to Utah County Sheriffs officials. He was captured by Salt Lake
County Sheriffs deputies at a gas station in Draper.
Welch, 23, pleaded guilty to aggravated murder the following year and was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.
At the time of that shooting, Adams, a three-year member of the Lehi Police Department, was
married and had an 8-month-old son.
In the aftermath of Monday's shooting, the task now is to support and pray for Terry and his
family, as well as the family in Washington that has lost a loved one, the mayor said.
"Right now, we'll do the best we can, pray and hope the Lord sees fit to bless him extra,"
Johnson said.
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He extolled the police officers, saying that many people don't pick professions with inherent
risks or obstacles.
"But these good (officers) take a job that has them all," he said. "And they do it with a sense of
cheer and happiness. We live in debt to them every day."
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Her family thought meds had aifrnent under control

Woman killed after shooting Lehi cop had history of mental
illness
By Melinda Rogers and Nate Carlisle
The Salt Lake Tribune
Salt Lake Tribune
Article Last Updated:06/24/2008 01:31:56 PM MDT

The family of Kelly Wark says the 34-year-old had been struggling with mental illness for several months before
she opened fire on a Lehi police captain during a traffic stop Monday and was killed by return fire.
"She had struggled with severe mental illness in the past year and was on her way to beginning a new life,"
Warkfs parents, Robert and Mary Wark of Gig Harbor, Wash., wrote in a statement released today. "We offer our
deepest condolences to the family of the officer that was hurt."
Gwyn Vukich, a cousin of the Wark family who is serving as the Wark family's spokesperson, would not
elaborate on specifics of Kelly Warkfs mental illness. But she said her cousin was on medication, and that her
death came as a shock for family who believed she had her illness under control.
Wark had moved to Utah to attend massage therapy school and excelled at art, Vukich said. She specialized in
portraits and had earned degrees in art and psychology from Western Washington University in Bellingham
before she decided she wanted to become a massage therapist, Vukich said.
Her parents called Wark a "gentle, kind and loving person" in the statement.
Police say Wark shot Capt. Harold Terry twice in the head after he pulled her over in response to reports of a
woman who might be driving under the influence. Terry was hospitalized in serious condition this afternoon but
is expected to make a full recovery, police said.
Sometime before 8:45 a.m., Wark arrived at a gas station on the corner of 850 East and Main Street, according
to police. The woman told the attendant she wanted to buy gas, said David Mayson, the station's manager, but
then changed her mind as the attendant was in the midst of scanning her debit card. All the while she acted
"distracted," Mayson said.
Video footage from the gas station shows Wark walking to her tan Honda Accord and standing there "staring
off into space," Mayson said. She drove away after a minute or so and the attendant called police to report the
woman might be driving under the influence.
Terry, a 55-year-old who has worked for Lehi police for 16 years, heard the call over his radio and responded.
Sgt. Darren Paul said dispatcher records show Terry reported stopping the Accord at 8:52 a.m. near 1000 E. Main
Street. Paul said Terry read the Washington state license plate number on the Accord to dispatchers before
approaching the car.
Other Lehi officers who arrived to assist Terry with the stop saw him speak with Wark inside the car. She was
still seated in her car when the assisting officers saw and heard her fire two shots from a .38-caliber revolver,
Paul said.
Both bullets struck Terry on the left side of the head, with at least one bullet striking above the ear and exiting
behind the ear, Paul said. Wark exited the car as the officers drew their weapons and ran toward her and Terry.
Two officers fired on Wark, Paul said. Terry also fired one shot but it struck the car, Paul said. Wark, dressed
in cargo pants and a dark shirt, died at the scene.
Terry communicated with medical personnel at the scene and later at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center.
Paul said Terry underwent at least one surgery Monday that removed bullet fragments.
"We are optimistic and hopeful for a full recovery," Paul said.

Vi+f«./AxraAx/ Qltrih mm/nortlet/article/html/frag^

06/24/2008

Along with having plenty of his own experience, Terry trained other officers from Lehi and around the state in
how to make traffic stops. The protocol includes specific ways to park behind the suspect's vehicle and how to
walk upon and interact with the driver. Paul said it appears all those protocols were followed Monday.
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